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ABSTRACT: How do crying foul strategies, such as accusing an opponent of trying to “terrify” into a 
decision, pressure arguers to argue well? I submit that they work by (1) making a norm determinate and (2) 
making manifest the badness of the tactic. I explain why they generate pressure to repair or abandon 
questionable tactics, particularly when the norms converge with those of a broader political culture. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How do arguers pressure each other to argue well, and why may they expect the 
strategies they use to work? Answers to these questions depend on the situation, 
including the political culture. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have suggested that 
arguers ought not to “automatically” counter fallacious moves by invoking rules with a 
“goody two-shoes response” (p. 436), and Jackson and Jacobs (2006) have suggested that 
making norms of argument determinate—by saying for example that “no reason has been 
given to suggest that those doubts are well-founded” (p. 96)—can be an effective 
countermove. I submit a theory that explains why. 
Using the methods of a normative pragmatic perspective (e.g., Manolescu 2005, 
pp. 139-42), I propose to analyze “crying foul” strategies and explain why they may 
pressure arguers to repair or abandon questionable tactics and adhere to norms of 
argumentation in a particular situation. Examples of “crying foul” strategies include 
saying that an opponent has tried to “frighten” or “terrify” into a decision, has exclaimed 
“with uncommon vehemence,” and the like. I submit that they work by (1) making a 
norm determinate and (2) making manifest the badness of the tactic. The force of or 
pressure generated by crying foul strategies to repair or abandon a questionable tactic 
derives from the fact that different kinds or levels of norms are built into them—both 
more transaction-level norms such as using relevant evidence and more procedure-level 
norms such as speaking in a manner that enables good judgment. The pressure increases 
as the norms of argumentation converge with those of a broader political culture. After 
outlining how a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable tactics 
supplements comparable approaches, I analyze crying foul strategies used in a case of 
actual, high-stakes political argumentation. 
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2. A NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COUNTERING QUESTIONABLE 
TACTICS 
 
Two ways that a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable tactics 
supplements some of the leading scholarship on dialectically-oriented pragmatic 
approaches to fallacies are the following. First, a normative pragmatic approach works 
from the inside out; it begins by examining the transaction itself—by asking what 
strategies arguers use and why. This is in contrast to an approach that works from the 
outside in—by applying rules or norms to particular cases. So for example the pragma-
dialecticians define fallacies as violations of rules or norms for a critical discussion—a 
theoretical ideal—and they bring theoretical coherence to the project of classifying 
fallacies by basing them on the stages—opening, confronting, arguing, concluding—of a 
critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 102-106). 
Similarly, Walton (1992, 1995, 2000) has argued that critics ought to evaluate 
specific tactics by measuring them against the goals of the dialogue type such as a critical 
discussion. His research builds upon the pragma-dialectical research program by, first, 
expanding the number and kind of dialogues beyond critical discussions to include 
persuasion, negotiation, and more. These dialogue types serve as theoretical ideals; as 
Walton (2000) notes, actual discourse such as political argumentation may not be easily 
classified into a single dialogue type. For Walton fallacies occur as arguers shift from one 
dialogue type to another—from, say, a critical discussion to a negotiation dialogue; a 
tactic may be appropriate in one dialogue type because it helps to achieve the goal of the 
dialogue type, but the same tactic may be inappropriate in another dialogue type because 
it interferes with achieving the goal. Thus a second way that Walton's research builds 
upon the pragma-dialectical research program is by assuming that there are degrees of 
fallaciousness and that researchers ought to attend to the context of the argumentation in 
evaluating whether a questionable tactic is a fallacy or blunder amenable to repair. 
Researchers working from a normative pragmatic perspective, in contrast, work 
from the inside out. A normative pragmatic theory explains how saying something makes 
it easier or more difficult to subsequently say other things. The explanation is neither 
limited to the particular case at hand nor an asituational account in the sense that the rules 
of a critical discussion are theoretical ideals regardless of the situation. They begin by 
asking what strategies arguers use and explain why arguers may reasonably expect the 
strategies to work in a given situation. Their research has shown that arguers use 
strategies that bring to bear in their particular situation norms of argumentation, and that 
the norms help to account for why arguers use particular strategies and may expect them 
to work (Goodwin 2001; Kauffeld 1998; Manolescu 2005). 
A second way that a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable 
tactics supplements some of the leading scholarship on dialectically-oriented pragmatic 
approaches to fallacies is that it lends itself to asking how arguers try to pressure 
opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics and why they may reasonably expect 
such strategies to work. For dialectically-oriented pragmatic approaches to fallacies, such 
moves would be viewed as secondary to the argument proper. Dialectically-oriented 
pragmatic approaches analyze argumentation with an eye toward how it achieves the goal 
of a given dialogue type, and countering questionable tactics at least at first glance seems 
to be less relevant to issues at hand in any given dialogue than to the procedure by which 
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decisions are made and justified. At best strategies designed to counter questionable 
tactics may be treated as a sub-discussion within the argument proper and at worst may 
be outside of the scope of analysis altogether. But given the ubiquity of questionable 
tactics, it is worth studying how arguers themselves characteristically attempt to counter 
them. 
Since a normative pragmatic perspective begins with the transaction itself, its 
analytical methods involve examining strategies arguers actually use. In addition, the 
perspective views the context not in terms of a dialogue type from which goals are 
deduced, but instead as something created by speaking itself (Goodwin 2007). It explains 
how saying something enables and constrains how auditors may respond and what 
arguers themselves may subsequently say. In the course of explaining why strategies may 
be expected to work, researchers analyzing argumentation from a normative pragmatic 
perspective also explain why, other things being equal, questionable tactics do not 
generate force or pressure (Manolescu 2005, pp. 146-47; Manolescu 2007, pp. 391-93). 
This research has shown that the weak pressure or lack of pressure of questionable tactics 
involves deviating from norms. In this study I continue that line of research by explaining 
why arguers can expect crying foul to counter questionable tactics to pressure opponents 
to make repairs or abandon the tactic. 
A fundamental assumption that a normative pragmatic perspective shares with 
pragma-dialectical perspectives is that researchers ought to consider how arguers balance 
goals that may at times be at odds with each other. The pragma-dialecticians’ recent 
research on strategic manoeuvring involves analyzing how arguers balance the goals of a 
critical discussion with individual success, and evaluating how they do so against the 
rules of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2006, p. 436). In this study I 
supplement that line of research by using a different analytical method—asking what 
strategies arguers use and why rather than reconstructing the argumentation as a critical 
discussion or analyzing strategic manoeuvring in terms of topic potential, audience 
adaptation, and presentational devices—and by examining what norms arguers bring to 
bear on the situation rather than applying a predetermined set of norms. 
 
3. CRYING FOUL 
 
To explain why arguers may expect crying foul about questionable tactics to pressure 
opponents to repair or abandon them, I analyze crying foul strategies in the 1788 Virginia 
ratifying convention debates. The debates are a circumscribed case of actual, high-stakes 
civic argumentation in which participants use and call each other on the use of 
questionable tactics. The issue was whether Virginia should ratify the proposed United 
States Constitution, and upon arrival to the convention delegates were almost evenly split 
(Briceland 1988, pp. 212-13; Einhorn 1990, pp. 148-49). But delegates did not argue only 
to garner support from those few who were amenable to persuasion. The debates took 
place before a viewing public in the galleries; in fact the venue for the debates was 
changed to accommodate more spectators. Moreover, the debates were published. 
Delegates therefore argued with an eye not only toward their peers but also toward 
constituents, a broader reading public, and posterity. For these audiences, delegates say 
they argue for other purposes including representing their constituents' views (e.g., Elliot 
1891, pp. 21, 63) and showing posterity that they did everything possible for the benefit 
BETH INNOCENTI 
 4
of Virginia and the Union (e.g., Elliot 1891, pp. 56, 637, 652). These purposes are easier 
to separate analytically than practically; saying they argue for posterity, for example, may 
be a way of persuading peers or garnering support from constituents. The point is that the 
arguers had multiple purposes for multiple audiences—not only or primarily persuading 
to believe the proposed constitution should or should not be ratified, or to vote for or 
against its ratification. 
There is any number of ways to cry foul, but I submit that core features are that 
crying foul (1) makes a norm determinate and (2) makes manifest that the opponent is 
damaging the deliberations. I call these core features because, as I explain in the 
discussion to follow, they both define crying foul strategies and give them force—that is, 
pressure opponents to repair or abandon the questionable tactic. 
 
Making a norm determinate 
 
First, consider a case where a speaker counters a questionable tactic by stating a claim 
and providing evidence only—without any meta-discussion or sub-discussion about the 
propriety of the tactic or, put differently, without crying foul. In the best case, the speaker 
can count on the merit of her argument to “speak for itself.” She can count on her 
opponent and spectators to see that she adheres to norms of argumentation while the 
opponent does not; and therefore can count on the opponent to hold himself to a higher 
standard and on spectators to hold the opponent to a higher standard. However, these 
assumptions seem risky in a context where questionable tactics are ubiquitous. In such 
contexts, if logical coherence alone pressured arguers to repair or abandon questionable 
tactics, then we would expect arguers to bring to bear on the situation the force of the 
better argument only. 
In a worse case, if the speaker does not cry foul about the opponent's questionable 
tactic, the opponent will continue to use it because the speaker has not created any reason 
for him not to use it and because the opponent presumably used it in the first place 
because he believed it would achieve some purpose or purposes. In perhaps the worst 
case from the speaker’s perspective, if the speaker does not cry foul about the opponent’s 
questionable tactic, then she puts herself at risk of criticism by spectators for poor 
judgment--for not recognizing a questionable tactic or, if spectators think she recognizes 
the questionability of the tactic, for not trying to promote the legitimacy of the particular 
transaction or, more broadly, the procedure. And therefore, even and perhaps especially if 
the speaker can count on spectators to hold the opponent to a higher standard, she does 
not foreclose the possibility of spectators criticizing her for an oversight or omission. 
Now, in contrast, consider a case where the speaker cries foul to counter a 
questionable tactic. In the Virginia ratifying convention debates delegates cry foul about 
different kinds of questionable tactics. For example, they cry foul about emotional 
appeals circumventing reason when they ask: “Are we to be terrified into a belief of its 
necessity” (Elliot 1891, p. 285; see also pp. 54, 62, 638). They cry foul about poor 
grounds when they assert: “It is a groundless objection, to work on gentlemen’s 
apprehensions” (Elliot 1891, p. 427). They cry foul about mismatches between style and 
significance when they say that an opponent “has highly colored the dangers” (Elliot 
1891, p. 466). Moreover, they cry foul frequently. Even Patrick Henry, the delegate who 
speaks most often (Briceland 1988, p. 211; Rutland 1966, p. 226, 233) and almost 
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certainly uses questionable tactics most often, complains about delegates who try to make 
spectators “intimidated by imaginary dangers” and to lead their minds “away by unfair 
misrepresentations and uncandid suggestions” (Elliot 1891, p. 140). What could Henry 
and other delegates expect crying foul to do and why? 
Crying foul pressures delegates to adhere to a norm by making the norm 
determinate because, other things being equal, making the norm determinate makes it 
difficult for auditors to say they did not know the norm. In doing so they risk criticism for 
being ill-equipped to participate in the proceedings. The risk is particularly serious as 
such prerequisites are made manifest throughout the proceedings as delegates say, for 
example, that opponents' appeals are “trifling with the judgment of their fellow-citizens” 
(Elliot 1891, p. 48), or that politics are “too often nourished by passion, at the expense of 
the understanding” (Elliot 1891, p. 23), or that every delegate “comes with a firm 
resolution coolly and calmly to examine, and fairly and impartially to determine” (Elliot 
1891, p. 42). To avoid the risks, auditors may repair or abandon the questionable tactic 
and adhere to the norm. Thus the force of or pressure generated by making a norm 
determinate—e.g., do not terrify into belief, do not make groundless objections, do not 
misrepresent facts—derives from bringing to bear in the situation and making 
determinate broader norms—e.g., do not interfere with the capacity to judge. This 
broader norm is both rhetorical and political, that is, a norm of political representation 
and citizenship: act in a way that enables good judgment. Making determinate this 
broader, political, procedural norm increases the risks to auditors of manifesting poor 
judgment on the level of a specific argument, because it makes manifest that localized 
flaws damage the proceedings and political process as well. 
For similar reasons, making a norm determinate pressures the speaker to adhere to 
it. Doing otherwise would be a fallible sign that she is ill-equipped to participate in the 
proceedings—that she has an inappropriate understanding of what counts as terrifying, 
for example, or that she thinks the norm does not apply to her own actions. Again, the 
risk is serious in this case given that broader norms they are grounded in—display and act 
in a way that enables good judgment—are also made manifest in the proceedings and 
have political analogues. To avoid this risk, the speaker must also avoid using the 
questionable tactic and adhere to the norm. 
 
Making badness manifest 
 
There is any number of ways that arguers can make norms determinate. Another core 
feature of crying foul strategies is that they make manifest the badness of the opponent’s 
conduct. As with making a norm determinate, other things being equal, manifesting the 
badness of the opponent's conduct pressures both auditors and speaker to repair, abandon, 
or avoid the questionable tactic and adhere to the norm. By crying foul, a speaker 
manifests a commitment to the position that the opponent is acting in a way that damages 
the deliberations. By pointing to the badness of the deliberations, she makes manifest that 
she is upset by the conduct and therefore expects the opponent to answer and make 
amends; of course there is no need to make amends for doing something good (Kauffeld 
1998, Goodwin 2002). Other things being equal, if an opponent were to continue arguing 
in the same way, he risks criticism for continuing to damage the proceedings. In the case 
of the Virginia ratification debates, the risk is serious given that delegates had pointed to 
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the need for good deliberations. For example, several had pointed to the need to avoid 
outside influence (Elliot 1891, pp. 7, 177) or the need to base their decision on “the force 
of reasoning” and not “declamation nor elegance of periods” which may “mislead the 
judgment” (Elliot 1891, p. 104). To avoid the risks, the opponent may repair or abandon 
the tactic and adhere to the norm. Thus the force of making manifest the badness of an 
opponent's conduct derives from bringing to bear on the situation converging rhetorical 
and political norms—e.g., act in a way that enables good judgment. 
By making manifest the badness of an opponent's deliberations, a speaker also 
risks criticism. Crying foul licenses the opponent to retaliate, because the speaker has 
impugned his conduct. So by crying foul a speaker risks criticism for damaging the 
opponent’s good name as well as for damaging the quality of the proceedings. Auditors 
could reason that the speaker would not want to put herself at risk for criticism unless she 
had made a responsible assessment of the situation, so the speaker undertaking additional 
risk for herself creates an additional reason for an opponent to repair or abandon the 
questionable tactic. Presumably others would see the conduct that the speaker saw but, by 
saying what she saw and manifesting its badness, the speaker brings to bear in the 
situation a norm of responsible conduct: do not unfairly impugn an opponent’s conduct. 
There are other ways that a speaker may make manifest that she has responsibly 
assessed the opponent's conduct. For example, she may make manifest that she has 
grounds for making the charge, or she may ask opponents to state exactly what grounds 
they have. In fact, throughout the debates delegates call for opponents to provide grounds 
(e.g., Elliot 1891, pp. 12, 66, 87). Giving them a chance to make their case shows that she 
is exercising forbearance. Again, this is a fallible sign that she has attempted to make a 
responsible assessment of the opponent’s conduct and, thus, forestalls criticism that she 
has unfairly impugned the conduct. In short, the more a speaker makes manifest the 
badness of an opponent's tactics, the greater the risk to the speaker of criticism for her 
tactics and conduct, and therefore the stronger the force or pressure on both her and the 
opponent to repair or abandon questionable tactics and adhere to norms of argumentation. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, crying foul pressures auditors to repair or abandon questionable tactics by 
making norms determinate and making manifest the badness of the opponent’s tactics. 
Crying foul generates pressure by creating risks for both auditors and speaker if they 
continue using the questionable tactic. It creates serious risks by bringing to bear on the 
situation converging rhetorical and political norms. Making manifest that an opponent 
has used shaky grounds to work on auditors' fears, for example, and that in doing so the 
opponent damages the quality of the proceedings and the political process, increases the 
force of all norms. 
This analysis helps to explain van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2006) observation 
that arguers ought not automatically counter fallacious moves by invoking rules with a 
goody two-shoes response. The force of the tactic depends on the situation or context. In 
the context of a debate class, invoking rules could pressure opponents to adhere to them 
because the norms of argumentation align with norms made manifest in the broader 
classroom context. In some—perhaps many or all—civic contexts, in contrast, political 
actors probably cannot count on auditors having a uniformly good education in sound 
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reasoning. This may account for why in the Virginia ratification debates we do not see 
arguers invoking rules in a dialectical vein to counter questionable tactics. 
If this is accurate, then there are two complementary explanations for why arguers 
in the Virginia ratification debates consistently counter questionable tactics by crying foul 
and do so by bringing to bear on the situation norms of argumentation that converge with 
political norms. First, consider the fact that crying foul makes a norm determinate. 
Arguers must bring to bear on the situation norms that auditors do know or ought to 
know. This is why they can count on them to pressure auditors to adhere to them. In the 
context of a debate by political elites before a broad citizenry, arguers may reasonably 
expect auditors to know the broader norms of the political culture. So making norms 
determinate both brings to bear on the situation norms that auditors know and coaches 
auditors in norms they ought to know.  
Second, consider the fact that crying foul makes manifest the badness of the 
opponent’s tactic. In a civic context, arguers may not be able to count on auditors 
acknowledging the badness of a tactic because by one measure it may align with a norm 
of effectiveness. In tension are norms of short-term, personal effectiveness and long-term, 
political and cultural effectiveness in the sense of promoting a desirable kind of political 
culture. These two senses of effectiveness need not be mutually exclusive, but political 
actors must balance short-term personal success with longer-term success and civic 
goods. Crying foul—making badness manifest—is one way arguers may tip the balance. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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